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I 
INTRODUCTION 
In early 1992, the Working Committee for Argentina,1 an advisory 
committee of eleven commercial banks, commenced negotiations to restructure 
Argentina’s external commercial-bank debt through a “Brady transaction,”2 
which provided for debt reduction and debt-service reduction to enable 
Argentina to achieve a more sustainable level of debt and to settle past-due 
interest on that debt. In the years prior to these negotiations, Argentina had 
undertaken many important structural reforms of its economy, had embarked 
on a privatization program, and had imposed fiscal discipline by enacting the 
Convertibility Law,3 which pegged the Argentine currency to the U.S. dollar. 
Normalizing Argentina’s relationship with the international banking community 
was critical to Argentina’s continued success in restructuring its economy and 
fostering future foreign investment. 
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 1. The role of the Working Committee was to negotiate the restructuring transactions with 
Argentina, recommend the terms of the negotiated transaction to Argentina’s commercial bank 
creditors around the world, and seek the approval of those creditors. 
 2. The term Brady transaction refers to Nicholas F. Brady, former Secretary of the Treasury 
under George H.W. Bush, who is considered the architect of the Brady plan. Announced in March 
1989, the Brady plan contemplated the commercial banks’ exchange of sovereign debt for bonds, either 
par or discount bonds, collateralized by a special issue of U.S. Treasury thirty-year zero-coupon bonds. 
 3. The Convertibility Law, which was enacted on March 27, 1991, and became effective April 1, 
1991, provided for the exchange of the Argentine austral at the rate of 10,000 australes to 1 U.S. dollar 
and the subsequent replacement of the austral by the peso at the rate of 1 peso to 10,000 australes. Law 
No. 23928, Mar. 27, 1991, [27104] B.O. 1. The peso remained pegged to the U.S. dollar at the rate of 1 
to 1, until January 6, 2002, when the Argentine Congress passed the Emergency Act, which revoked the 
convertibility regime. Law No. 25561, Jan. 6, 2002, [29810] B.O. 1. 
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The first Brady transaction had been concluded by Mexico in 1989, so the 
principal bond-exchange mechanics and documentation had been developed 
and successfully implemented. The massive interest arrears on Argentina’s 
external commercial-bank debt, though, presented novel issues to be addressed 
in the context of Argentina’s Brady transaction. Further complicating these 
issues, Argentine sovereign debt in the form of commercial-bank loans had 
been traded heavily in the market during the years of Argentina’s default on 
interest payments. Determining which banks were entitled to interest payments 
proved to be a difficult and time-consuming task that necessitated changes in 
the timing and approach to closing the Brady transaction for Argentina. This 
article describes the challenges and the solutions to the many practical and legal 
issues that stemmed from Argentina’s interest arrears. 
II 
NEGOTIATIONS OF THE MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING 
From the end of January 1992 through early April 1992, Argentine officials 
and the Working Committee met in New York to discuss and exchange 
proposals on the key aspects of a possible Brady transaction. Not surprisingly, 
discussions of the terms of the discount bond (a bond issued at less than the 
principal amount of the debt exchanged) focused on the appropriate percentage 
of the principal discount and the interest spread; and discussions of the par 
bond (a bond issued at the same principal amount as the debt exchanged) 
focused on the applicable initial interest rate and the later step-up of the 
interest rate. Consistent with the characteristic Brady bond, the principal of 
both the discount and par bonds was to be collateralized by U.S. Treasury 
thirty-year, zero-coupon bonds. Of particular focus was the amount of interest-
collateral coverage that would be required for each of these bonds. 
Although the negotiations of the key terms of the discount and par bonds 
were difficult, the interest-arrears negotiations proved to be particularly so, 
given Argentina’s limited resources. Argentina’s interest arrears exceeded $8 
billion—an amount that had been reduced from about $10 billion as a result of 
the cancellation of external debt in privatization transactions. The negotiations 
centered on the need to resume monthly interest payments and the amount of 
the cash payment to be made at closing. 
Even though a number of significant issues were still not agreed upon, 
Argentina and the Working Committee decided to reconvene negotiations in 
the Dominican Republic, where the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) 
meetings were then being held. With the international press covering the IDB 
meetings, it was critical that the parties either reach agreement that weekend or 
risk publicly failing. After two days of continuous negotiations, an agreement in 
principle was reached in the early hours of the morning on April 7, 1992, and a 
press conference followed several hours later. 
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The agreement in principle4 reached between Argentina and the Working 
Committee contemplated the exchange of the external-debt principal for either 
discount or par bonds, as follows: 
1. A thirty-year, collateralized discount bond, with a 35% discount on 
principal of the existing claims, bearing interest at a floating rate of 
LIBOR (London Interbank Offered Rate) plus 0.8125% per annum, 
with interest payments collateralized in an amount equal to twelve 
months; and 
2.  A thirty-year, collateralized par bond, exchangeable for 100% of 
existing claims, bearing an initial interest rate of 4% per annum and 
increasing annually, capped at a fixed rate of 6% in the seventh year, 
with interest payments collateralized in an amount equal to twelve 
months. 
The agreement in principle also provided for monthly interest payments of 
$70 million until closing, a $400 million cash payment at closing, past-due 
interest (PDI) notes aggregating $300 million, and PDI bonds for the remaining 
interest arrears. 
Although an agreement in principle was reached on key terms of the 
financing plan, the practical and legal challenges of developing this ten-page 
document into a more-comprehensive term sheet still lay ahead. 
III 
NEGOTIATIONS OF THE REPUBLIC OF ARGENTINA: THE 1992 FINANCING 
PLAN 
Over the course of the next two and one-half months, Argentina and the 
Working Committee negotiated the terms of the 1992 Financing Plan.5 In 
developing the procedures for the Argentine bond exchanges, the parties were 
able to build upon the structure of the par bonds and discount bonds created 
under the Mexican Brady-bond transaction. What proved more challenging, 
however, was developing procedures to address the practical and legal issues 
within the Financing Plan for dealing with the substantial amount of past-due 
interest. 
One of the first issues to be addressed in these negotiations was to 
determine what would constitute “eligible interest” and “eligible debt.” These 
definitions were important because, preceding the 1992 negotiations, there had 
been a tremendous volume of trading in Argentine debt, including potentially 
trades made either directly or indirectly by or for the benefit of Argentina and 
its various public-sector borrowers. Given the scarce resources available to 
 
 4. See generally REPUBLIC OF ARGENTINA SUMMARY PROPOSAL FOR A NEW FINANCING 
PACKAGE (1992) (on file with Law and Contemporary Problems). 
 5. See generally THE REPUBLIC OF ARGENTINA 1992 FINANCING PLAN (1992) [hereinafter 1992 
FINANCING PLAN] (on file with Law and Contemporary Problems). 
OLIVIER 1/16/2011 
244 LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS [Vol. 73:241 
purchase collateral for the bond exchange and to make cash payments on the 
interest arrears, Argentina and the Working Committee specifically agreed that 
the definition of eligible debt would exclude external debt held by or on behalf 
of any Argentine governmental agency (other than an Argentine bank). 
External debt held by or on behalf of an Argentine bank for its own account 
would be eligible only to the extent that principal owed to the bank exceeded 
the principal that the bank owed to others. The definition of eligible interest 
included similar exceptions. Although any debt-buybacks by Argentina or its 
various public-sector borrowers proved difficult to confirm, the Financing Plan 
expressly recognized that collateral security for the newly issued bonds and cash 
paid on past-due interest should not be for the benefit of these creditors.6 
The 1992 Financing Plan established detailed interim measures relating to, 
among other things, the adjustment of fixed-rate loans, interest calculations and 
the resetting of interest periods, and the application of monthly interest 
payments.7 The plan also provided guidance on the reconciliation process itself. 
Dealing with existing interest arrears and the accrual of interest pending the 
implementation of the Financing Plan was a sizeable undertaking. Developing 
detailed procedures for the existing facility agents and the lenders under the 
various loan agreements evidencing existing debt was thus critical if there was 
to be any hope of determining, in any reasonable period of time, those of the 
over-800 participants that were entitled to the interest arrangements. 
On June 23, 1992, the Republic of Argentina 1992 Financing Plan was 
finalized and distributed to the international banking community. Even though 
the plan—which exceeded 150 pages with its annexes, exhibits, and schedules—
was thorough and detailed, no one could have predicted the effect of the 
market on creditor banks’ choices between discount and par bonds. Nor could 
anyone have known the magnitude of the task of reconciling interest as a 
consequence of interest accruals over a number of years or the added 
complexity of the way in which Argentina’s defaulted debt traded in the 
market. 
IV 
IMPLEMENTATION OF THE FINANCING PLAN 
Although the 1992 Financing Plan set forth many of the details of the bond 
exchange, its implementation presented several practical challenges, among 
them (1) a disproportionate election of par bonds by the creditor banks, (2) 
concerns about the application of the sharing provisions of the existing debt 
agreements, and (3) difficulties with the debt and past-due interest 
reconciliation process, the attendant delays, and the potential claims of 
creditors to the escrowed assets. 
 
 6. See 1992 FINANCING PLAN, supra note 5, at ii– iii. 
 7. See 1992 FINANCING PLAN, supra note 5, pt. IV, at 1–3. 
OLIVIER 1/16/2011 
Fall 2010] ADDRESSING INTEREST ARREARS IN A BRADY TRANSACTION 245 
A.  Disproportionate Election of Par Bonds by Creditors 
 When the 1992 Financing Plan agreement was reached, Minister of 
Economy and Public Works and Services Domingo Cavallo stated, 
Argentina has received indications from official sources as to the financing of the 
collateral for the 1992 Financing Plan. Such financing will be made available to 
Argentina only in compliance with the rules and restrictions imposed by such official 
sources, and Argentina relies upon the ability to access the full amount available if it is 
to be able to implement the plan. To this end, it is essential that Argentina’s creditors 
make a balanced selection of the Discount and Par Bond options if Argentina is to 
implement the entire package.8 
The amount mentioned publicly that Argentina was to obtain from these 
official sources—entities such as the International Monetary Fund, the World 
Bank, and the Inter-American Development Bank—was approximately $3 
billion for purchasing collateral for the bonds.9 
In the spirit of the Brady plan’s “menu of options” approach, the Financing 
Plan gave the creditors free election between discount and par bonds. Due to 
falling interest rates, however, the par bond had become increasingly attractive, 
and creditors were choosing this option disproportionately. Although the par 
bonds would reduce Argentina’s debt service in future years, they were also 
considered more expensive to collateralize.10 
In late September, the Argentine government advised the creditor banks 
that the Financing Plan could not be implemented without a reallocation of 
their elections. The government requested that creditors voluntarily rebalance 
all their elections. Although many creditors responded favorably and did so, the 
targeted balance was still not achieved. 
Later that November, the Argentine government informed its creditor 
banks that, although many of them had agreed to rebalance their elections, 
many others had conditioned their agreement to rebalance on other creditors 
doing likewise.11 Thus, it became imperative that all creditors accept a 
rebalancing to enable Argentina to reach an overall election of not more than 
sixty-five percent par bonds. Although negotiations for documentation 
implementing the Financing Plan were already far along, additional provisions 
had to be added to the Financial Plan implementation documents to ensure the 
proper election result.12 
 
 8. Memorandum from Domingo F. Cavallo, Minister of Econ. and Pub. Works and Serv., to the 
Int’l Banking Cmty. 3 (June 23, 1992) (on file with Law and Contemporary Problems). 
 9. James R. Kraus, Argentina’s Debt Pact Hits Snag on Collateral, AM. BANKER, Aug. 3, 1992, at 
1. 
 10. Id. at 7. See also Argentina Closes Pact with Banks on Brady Debt Restructuring, REUTERS 
(Buenos Aires), Nov. 10, 1992. 
 11. Memorandum from Domingo F. Cavallo, Minister of Econ. and Pub. Works and Serv., to the 
Int’l Fin. Cmty. (Nov. 10, 1992) (on file with Law and Contemporary Problems). 
 12. Section 2.07 of the Collateralized Discount and Par Bond Exchange Agreement, entitled 
“Percentage Allocations Among Par Bonds and Discount Bonds: Adjustment of Percentage 
Allocations,” and dated December 6, 1992, sets forth the rules that would be applicable to the 
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B.  Application of Sharing Provisions Under Existing Debt Agreements 
Under the existing Argentine syndicated-loan agreements, each lender had 
an obligation under the applicable sharing provision to share with the other 
lenders any disproportionate interest payment it received respecting the 
amounts owed to it and other creditors. Amending the sharing provision would 
have required one hundred percent of the lenders’ consent under the relevant 
debt agreement. At the time of the 1992 Financing Plan, however, a number of 
non-bank creditors refused to commit to the plan. 
Even those creditors not participating in the Financing Plan still had the 
benefit of the sharing provisions of the existing agreements. Although sharing 
interest payments with non-participating creditors was difficult for participating 
creditors to accept, the $700 million in cash interest payments13 was distributed 
to all creditors holding eligible interest for both legal and practical reasons. The 
legal reason was that each creditor had a contractual commitment to share; the 
practical reason was that a non-participant creditor could invoke the sharing 
provisions with respect to the cash payments and could pursue any other 
available remedies. 
C.  Reconciliation Process Complexities and Escrow Arrangements 
The 1992 Financing Plan contemplated a simultaneous closing of the bond 
exchange and the implementation of the interest arrangements. Because 
Argentine external debt had traded heavily during the many years Argentina 
had been in default on paying interest, the process of identifying the creditors 
entitled to participate in the interest arrangements and determining the amount 
of interest to which such creditors would be entitled proved to be a long and 
tedious task. Moreover, debt-to-equity privatizations using external debt 
continued during the reconciliation process and added another layer of 
complexity. Originally, it had been thought that the reconciliation process 
would be substantially completed by the first quarter of 1993, with the closing to 
occur at that time. It was also thought that at the time of closing, a small amount 
of cash and bonds, which were to be exchanged for the amounts not yet 
reconciled, would be placed in escrow with the closing agent, Citibank, N.A. 
What became clear by mid-November was that the reconciliation process, 
particularly the reconciliation of past-due interest, would take considerably 
more time than had been expected. At this point, Argentina expressed concern 
that a delay in the closing might impair its ability to acquire the collateral 
needed to secure the principal bonds. Argentina requested a change in the 
 
allocations between discount and par bonds. See COLLATERALIZED DISCOUNT AND PAR BOND 
EXCHANGE AGREEMENT § 2.07 (1992) (on file with Law and Contemporary Problems). 
 13. Argentina decided to pay $700 million in cash rather than to pay $400 million and to issue $300 
million in zero-coupon bonds, as was originally contemplated in the 1992 Financing Plan. The recital in 
the Floating Rate Bond Exchange Agreement refers to the $300 million as the “Interest Reduction 
Cash Payment.” See FLOATING RATE BOND EXCHANGE AGREEMENT § 3.04 (1992) (on file with Law 
and Contemporary Problems). 
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Financing Plan to permit the exchange of principal to occur prior to the 
settlement of the past-due interest. 
The Working Committee agreed to provide the flexibility to decouple the 
settlement of the principal and the past-due interest on the conditions that (1) 
Argentina issue the bonds and pay the cash amounts respecting past-due 
interest in escrow for the benefit of the creditors at the same time as the closing 
for the principal bond exchange and (2) Argentina not retain any interest in 
such bonds or cash amounts and exercise no control over the release of such 
bonds and cash to the creditors upon the reconciliation of the past-due interest. 
The bond-exchange agreements were modified to provide the details of the 
escrow arrangement in accordance with these conditions. They also provided 
that the closing agent would appoint the escrow agent and that the escrow agent 
would act solely on the instructions of the closing agent.14 
The escrow included the full amount of the cash payment and bonds in the 
amounts sufficient to cover the remainder of the past-due interest. Given the 
size of this escrow and its visibility, it became clear that the closing agent could 
not serve as the escrow agent and that an official-sector institution was needed. 
Both the Bank of England and the Bank for International Settlements (BIS) 
were being considered by the Working Committee to act as the escrow agent. 
On November 18, 1992, Shearman & Sterling sent a letter to the Bank of 
England, and Cleary Gottlieb sent an identical letter to the BIS to explore each 
institution’s interest in acting as the escrow agent. 
The Bank of England was a desirable option. Prejudgment attachment was 
unavailable in England, so there was little possibility that the escrow would be 
frozen pending reconciliation. And the risk of a creditor of Argentina 
successfully instituting and maintaining a Mareva injunction15—a court order 
with a similar legal effect as a prejudgment attachment—was considered 
remote. Although the official charter of the BIS seemed to indicate that 
sovereign deposits were immune from prejudgment attachments,16 the parties 
were unsure whether this immunity would be available for the escrowed assets 
in which Argentina retained no interest. The parties were not certain that the 
BIS would agree to waive such immunity. Because of the limited time available 
to consider and resolve to everyone’s satisfaction the issues concerning the BIS 
serving as escrow agent, the decision was made to proceed with the Bank of 
England. 
 
 14. The relevant provisions relating to the escrow arrangements are set forth in section 3.05 of the 
Collateralized Discount and Par Bond Exchange Agreement dated December 6, 1992, see supra note 
12, at § 3.05, and in section 3.04 of the Floating Rate Bond Exchange Agreement dated December 6, 
1992, see supra note 13. 
 15. Mareva Compania Naviera SA v. Int’l Bulk Carriers SA, (1975) 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 509 (A.C.). 
 16. Convention Respecting the Bank for International Settlements, Constituent Charter for the 
Bank of International Settlements para. 10, Jan. 20, 1930, 104 L.N.T.S. 441, available at http://www.bis 
.org/about/charter.pdf. 
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The escrow arrangement proceeded smoothly, and the Bank of England 
remained the escrow agent for more than two years. During this two-year 
period, most of the reconciliation and distribution of the escrowed assets were 
made. The only assets remaining in the escrow were particularly problematic or 
disputed claims. On April 29, 1994, the Bank of England appointed Citibank, 
N.A. (London), as successor escrow agent and transferred to it approximately 
$7 million in floating-rate bonds and less than $1 million in cash.17 
V 
INTERPLEADER ARRANGEMENTS 
To address the possibility that two creditors might not agree to settle a 
dispute as to the entitlement to an amount of eligible debt or eligible interest, 
provisions had to be included in the bond-exchange documentation to provide 
for such disputes to be resolved in another forum. Because it would be 
important to document the procedure for resolving such disputes and to provide 
protections to the escrow agent and the closing agent, the exchange agreements 
proposed that any dispute regarding eligible debt or eligible interest be 
interpleaded if it could not be resolved by the parties. Both the Floating Rate 
Bond Exchange Agreement and Collateralized Discount and Par Bond 
Exchange Agreement set forth detailed provisions relating to interpleader 
actions, including (1) the jurisdiction of the New York state and U.S. federal 
courts; (2) waiver of forum non conveniens; (3) details regarding service of 
process; (4) certain procedural aspects of the interpleader action; (5) dismissal 
of Argentina, the escrow agent, and the closing agent from the action; and (6) 
reimbursement of the allocable share of the costs incurred by the escrow agent 
and the closing agent in connection with the interpleader action.18 
Only one interpleader complaint was filed by Citibank, N.A. (London), as 
successor escrow agent, and this complaint was filed in the U.S. District Court 
for the Southern District of New York. The total amount in dispute between 
the two creditors was less than $3.5 million; pursuant to the interpleader 
agreement, Citibank deposited $3,157,000 in floating-rate bonds and 
$421,665.91 in cash.19 
VI 
CONCLUSION 
The Argentine Brady transaction presented many novel legal and practical 
issues in both the negotiation and implementation of the 1992 Financing Plan. 
 
 17. Letter from the Bank of England to Citibank, N.A. (London), Successor Escrow Agent (Apr. 
29, 1994) (on file with Law and Contemporary Problems). 
 18. See COLLATERALIZED DISCOUNT AND PAR BOND EXCHANGE AGREEMENT, supra note 12, 
at § 3.05; FLOATING RATE BOND EXCHANGE AGREEMENT, supra note 13, at § 3.04. 
 19. Citibank, N.A. v. Banco de la Provincia de Rio Negro, No. 94 Civ. 3705 (S.D.N.Y. filed May 18, 
1994). 
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The transaction’s success is a testament to the hard work, tough decisions, and 
flexibility of Argentina and the Working Committee; to the skills of the closing 
agent and the facility agents that the process of reconciling over $30 billion 
ended with only $3.5 million in dispute; and to the cooperation and support of 
the Bank of England. And for the attorneys representing the various parties, it 
was a rewarding team effort to solve the complex and challenging legal issues 
that this unique transaction presented. 
 
